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THE PRIVACY COST OF CURRENCY
Karin Thrasher*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most central banks issue two types of money: banknotes and reserve 
deposits.
1
Banknotes, or cash, can be used continuously by any person for 
nearly every transaction, and provide anonymity for the parties. Meanwhile, 
reserve deposits are largely restricted to a limited number of entities and 
banks. These reserve deposits are used for large-value-settlement.
2
Howev-
er, as digitization increases, the role and form of money is changing.
3
In re-
sponse to pressure produced by the increase in new forms of money and the 
potential for a cashless society, states are exploring potential substitutes to 
cash. Governments have begun to investigate the intersection of digitization 
and fiat currency: Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDC”).
4
Before discussing CBDCs, it is vital to recognize the role cash plays in 
the modern financial system. The greatest attribute of cash is that it carries 
only the information of value, protecting purchaser privacy.
5
Cash is the on-
ly established payment system that scored “full anonymity” in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s (“IMF”) survey on CBDC; cash protects privacy 
because no account is required, and there is no record of transactions.
6
Even 
central banks, the issuer of legal tender fiat currency, cannot know who pos-
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to, and insights on, this topic. Finally, I am grateful for the stellar editing and support of the 
editorial staff at MJIL—of whom I would especially like to thank Alessandro Storchi for his 
invaluable edits.
1. Noriyuki Yanagawa & Hiromi Yamaoka, Digital Innovation, Data Revolution, and 
Central Bank Digital Currency 2 (Bank of Japan Working Paper Series No. 19-E-2, 2019).
2. See id.
3. Christine Lagarde, IMF Managing Dir., Address at the Singapore Fintech Festival: 
Winds of Change: The Case for a New Digital Currency 2 (Nov. 14, 2018), https:
//www.imf.org/~/media/Files/News/Speech/111418-md-sg-fintech-speech.ashx?la=en.
4. See id. at 3 (explaining that “Various central banks around the world are seriously 
considering these ideas, including Canada, China, Sweden, and Uruguay. They are embracing 
change and new thinking—as indeed is the IMF.”).
5. See G45, WORLD CASH REPORT 4 (2018).
6. See TOMMASO MANCINI-GRIFFOLI, MARIA SOLEDAD MARTINEZ PERIA, ITAI 
AGUR, ANIL ARI, JOHN KIFF, ADINA POPESCU, & CELINE ROCHON, IMF STAFF DISCUSSION 
NOTE: CASTING LIGHT ON CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY 39 (Nov. 2018).




 Cash continues to be the favored payment instrument for indi-
viduals who seek anonymity in their transactions,
8
 and remains the most 
widely used payment instrument.
9
 However, the availability of alternate 
payment structures is growing; in particular, the rate at which electronic 
payment transactions volumes are increasing is outpacing the rate at which 
cash is used.
10
 In sum, this results in cash holding a progressively smaller 
share of the payments market.
11
 
Cash, while praised for its clear compliance with international privacy 
standards, is not without pitfalls. In the financial system, cash is scrutinized 
for its role in money laundering and terrorist financing; the international re-
quirements for compliance in these areas are continuously evolving.
12
 Cash 
allows for transactions with complete anonymity.
13
 Complete anonymity, 
however, comes with trade-offs.
14
 Cash is a successful medium for illegal 
activity, such as money laundering, terrorist financing, and tax evasion.
15
 




While the desire to limit money laundering and terrorist financing 
through reducing the availability of cash is widely recognized as valid, 
states “do not owe any customary international law obligations with respect 
 
 7. See David Winning & James Glynn, The World’s Cash is Disappearing. Bankers 
Aren’t Sure Where It Went, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2019, 4:01 PM) https://www.wsj.com
/articles/the-worlds-cash-is-disappearing-bankers-arent-sure-where-it-went-11576184491. 
 8. See ECB Crypto-Assets Task Force, Crypto-Assets: Implications for Financial Sta-
bility, Monetary Policy, and Payments and Market Infrastructures (Occasional Paper Series, 
No. 223/ May 2019). 
 9. See G45, supra note 5, at 4. 
 10. See id. at 15. 
 11. See generally id. at 15. 
 12. Mercy W. Buku & Michael W. Meredith, Safaricom and M-PESA in Kenya: Fi-
nancial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, 8 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 375, 394 (2013). 
 13. Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières [“SUREF”], Do We 
Need Central Bank Digital Currency? Economics, Technology, and Institutions, 2018/2 
SUERF Conf. Proceedings 28 (2018). 
 14. Some authors have suggested that a coordinated international regulation of money 
forms that provide anonymity, such as cryptocurrencies, could assist in reducing the evasion 
of sanctions, terrorist financing, and tax evasion. These proposals, however, sacrifice the in-
ternational right to privacy in the process, showcasing the inherent tension between privacy 
and illegal activity. See, e.g., Emma Macfarlane, Note, Strengthening Sanctions: Solutions to 
Curtail the Evasion of International Economic Sanctions Through the Use of Cryptocurrency, 
42 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199 (2020). 
 15. See SUREF, supra note 13, at 28. 
 16. See generally Emanuele Borgonovo, Stefano Caselli, Alessandra Cillo, Donato 
Masciandaro & Giovanni Rabitti, Cryptocurrencies, Central Bank Digital Cash, Traditional 
Money: Does Privacy Matter? 7 (Ctr. for Applied Rsc.h on Int’l Markets, Banking, Fin., and 
Regul. Working Paper No. 95, 2018) (noting that “[a]mong the individuals that like the ano-
nymity property are people who appreciate this property for illegal reasons, as an anonymous 
currency can be an effective device for money laundering.”). 
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to the protection of other countries’ monetary systems” aside from the duty 
to prevent counterfeiting.
17
This balancing between domestic legislation to 
limit the channels available for illicit activities and the international re-
quirement to protect the fundamental right to privacy creates a fundamental 
tension.
Jurisdictions have begun researching and developing CBDCs to serve in 
lieu of cash.
18
  Some central banks are analyzing the potential for a CBDC 
that could be made available to the public and serve as a substitute for cash 
by providing an alternate, safe, and robust payment instrument.
19
The 
acknowledgement by international bodies that a world without cash is imag-
inable has encouraged the development of CBDCs.
20
However, eliminating 
cash would undermine privacy of individuals.
21
The creation of a CBDC in 
response to the potential cashless society raises the question whether the an-
onymity previously provided by cash must be safeguarded by the state.
This note will conclude that a central bank in a cashless society must 
opt for the token-based form of CBDC, which provides the most privacy to 
individuals. States that choose an account-based CBDC will be in violation 
of fundamental international privacy principles.  Part I of the note will pro-
vide an overview of Central Bank Digital Currencies, drawing the crucial 
distinction between account-based and token-based currencies. Part II will 
establish that the broad right to privacy in the digital age is inclusive of per-
sonal financial data and elaborate on the right to privacy specifically in-
volved by financial transactions, describing the derivation of the lawful and 
arbitrary standards from article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Part III will conclude that while the lawful 
standard of article 17 is not dispositive of account-based CBDCs, the rele-
vant factors lean in favor of token-based CBDCs. The favor of token-based 
CBDCs will be solidified in Part IV, where account-based CBDCs will be 
shown to be arbitrary, in violation of article 17. Finally, Parts V and VI will 
provide policy implications and concluding thoughts.
17. Charles Proctor, Cryptocurrencies in International and Public Law Conceptions of 
Money, in CRYPTOCURRENCIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 33, 40 (David Fox & Sarah 
Green eds., 2019).
18. See SVERIGES RIKSBANK, THE RIKSBANK’S E-KRONA PROJECT REP. 1 at 4 (2017) 
(explaining that Sweden has begun to see a decline in the use of cash, but that those develop-
ments are unique from an international perspective).
19. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT.
INFRASTRUCTURES [“CMPI”], CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 7 (2018) https:
//www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf.
20. See Yanagawa & Yamaoka, supra note 1 at 5; see also Raphael Auer & Rainer 
Böehme, The Technology of Retail Central Bank Currency, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2020, at 85,
86–87.
21. See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 20.
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II. THE STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES
A CBDC does not yet have a precise definition because of the wide var-
iation in form that the instrument can take. Despite the lack of a specific 
definition, a CBDC has been proposed by several sources as a “widely ac-
cessible digital form of fiat money that could be legal tender.”
22
There are 
four key factors in distinguishing a CBDC: issuer, accessibility, form, and 
technology used.
23
First, as the name suggests, a CBDC is issued by the central bank.
24
Second, CBDCs can be either widely accessible to individuals similar to 
cash or bank deposits, and thus meant for general purpose, or can be re-
stricted to a limited number of financial institutions and banks, and thus 
meant for wholesale purposes only.
25
A general purpose CBDC is designed 
to be widely accessible to households and businesses without the involve-
ment of a bank intermediary.
26
This note will focus only on general-purpose 
forms of CBDCs. The wholesale form of a CBDC is more akin in function 
to central bank reserves and is outside the scope of this note. Third, the cur-
rency takes a digital form, as opposed to a physical currency such as cash.
27
The fourth factor, the technology employed, is the main point of divergence 
between the different types of CBDC.
28
There are two basic potential sys-
tems: a token-based currency, or an account-based currency.
A token-based currency is characterized by a few key distinctions that 
allow for the provision of anonymity.
29
First, a token-based currency would 
likely utilize a cryptographic scheme that does not require user identifica-
tion.
30
Second, the token-based currency would likely use some form of dis-
22. See id. at 4.
23. See Christian Barontini & Henry Holden, Proceeding with Caution—A Survey on 
Central Bank Digital Currency 1 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS Papers No. 101, 2019).
24. See WORLD BANK, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY (DLT) AND BLOCKCHAIN
FINTECH NOTE NO. 1 4 (2017).
25. See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
26. See Lael Brainard, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks on the Mone-
tary Policy, Technology, and Globalization Panel at Monetary Policy: The Challenges Ahead, 
an ECB Colloquium (Dec. 18, 2019).
27. See Hossein Nabilou, Central Bank Digital Currencies: Preliminary Legal Obser-
vations, J. BANKING REGUL. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3329993.
28. See Tammaro Terracciano & Luciano Somoza, Central Bank Digital Currency: The 
Devil is in the Details, LSE BUS. REV. (May 26, 2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview
/2020/05/26/central-bank-digital-currency-the-devil-is-in-the-details/ (arguing the two key 
distinctions in types of Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDC”) are token-based and ac-
count-based technologies, and single-tier and two-tier distribution systems).
29. See id. (noting that in a token-based CBDC, it is technologically possible to imple-
ment a system of anonymous offline transactions).
30. See Nabilou, supra note 27, at 17 (citing Yves Mersch, Member Executive Board 
of the ECB, Digital Base Money: An Assessment from the ECB’s Perspective, Speech at the 
Winter 2021] The Privacy Cost of Currency 407
tributed ledger technology (“DLT”).
31
DLT’s important contribution in the 
formation of currency is the provision of a system that allows for trust 
among anonymous participants without any need for trust across institu-
tions.
32
An account-based CBDC requires a central party—the central bank.
33
The account-based system involves a transfer of a claim on an account.
34
In 
this system, the user would request a transfer of funds between accounts 
held at the central bank. The central bank would then ensure settlement, but 
only after verification of authority to use the account, and authenticity of the 
recipient’s account.
35
Thus, the account-based system requires a much larger 
exchange of information than a token-based system.
The level of anonymity associated with each of these technologies is a 
key concern for designers of CBDC.
36
Further, the appropriate degree of 
privacy is a challenge in a digital environment and demands careful consid-
eration of public policy design choices.
37
Throughout the discussion of applicability of international privacy law, 
it is precarious to equate CBDCs to other forms of virtual currencies be-
cause CBDCs face the unique threat of mass centralization and data collec-
tion.
38
The CBDC’s issuer is the most impactful factor on privacy implica-
tions when compared to other virtual currencies. While CBDCs are issued 
and governed by the country’s central bank, other virtual currencies are 
governed by disparate online communities.
39
Because CBDCs are issued by 
central banks and require reliance on the central bank for full functionality, 
large amounts of sensitive information will accumulate.
40
In particular, in an 
account-based CBDC system, all transactions of citizens will be visible to 
Farewell Ceremony for Pentti Hakkarainen (Jan. 16, 2017)); Auer & Böehme, supra note 20
at 86–87.
31. SANTIAGO FERNÁNDEZ DE LIS & JAVIER SEBASTIÁN, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL 
CURRENCIES AND DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2019).
32. See WORLD BANK, supra note 24, at 2.
33. CPMI, supra note 19, at 4
34. See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 8.
35. See WORLD BANK, supra note 24, at 7.
36. See Chen Ye & Kevin C. Desouza, The Current Landscape of Central Bank Digital 
Currencies, BROOKINGS (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/12
/13/the-current-landscape-of-central-bank-digital-currencies/.
37. CPMI, supra note 19, at 10.
38. See Tom Wilson, Explainer: Central Bank Digital Currencies—Moving Towards 
Reality?, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cenbank-digital-
currencies-explainer/explainer-central-bank-digital-currencies-moving-towards-reality-
idUSKBN1ZM2JH (explaining that CBDCs are fundamentally different than cryptocurrencies 
because of their status as legal tender); see also Linda M. Schilling, École Polytechnique 
CREST, Speech prepared for Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee: Risks Involved with 
CBDCs: On Cash, Privacy, and Information Centralization, (Oct. 29–30, 2019).
39. See Wilson, supra note 38.
40. See Schilling, supra note 38, at 3.
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the central bank. This system creates a greater central accumulation of sen-
sitive information than in the current system of segmented multiple private 
banks collecting information on customers.
41
While no state is yet to proffer a permanent CBDC, the idea is at the 
forefront of state-based innovation across jurisdictions and multilateral insti-
tutions. A majority of central banks have begun researching CBDCs.
42
Sev-
eral central banks have begun studying the concept, and a few states have 
undertaken pilot programs to more fully explore the idea.
43
Overall, roughly 
seventy percent of respondents to the 2018 Bank for International Settle-
ments survey reported that they were engaged in CBDC work.
44
The reasons driving the development and research of CBDCs vary 
based on the status of the state. Developed states are investigating CBDCs 
to increase payment safety and efficiency, whereas emerging market econ-
omies are creating CBDCs to facilitate financial inclusion.
45
Crucially for 
the analysis of a CBDC under the international privacy framework, some 
advanced economies are motivated by the prospect of a cashless state which 
may allow for increased public utility.
46
Further, central banks are anticipat-
ed to be encouraged by currency forms that support “monetary policy, fi-
nancial stability, and integrity.”
47
III. THE BROAD RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
A. International Privacy Framework
The rise of CBDCs, and variance in technology used to create the cur-
rency, raises the question of which form, if any, may best comply with In-
ternational Privacy Law standards. For example, Sweden has researched 
both an account-based and a token-based e-krona and is proceeding in con-
tracting a consulting company, Accenture, to develop the currency plan fur-
ther.
48
The Tunisia initiative, promoted directly by the government, issued 
41. Id. at 4.
42. See Barontini & Holden, supra note 23, at 11.
43. See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 27; see also Yanagawa & 
Yamaoka, supra note 1, at 9.
44. See Barontini & Holden, supra note 23, at 7.
45. See id. at 9.
46. See Emanuele Borgonovo, Stefano Caselli, Alessandra Cillo, & Donato Mascianda-
ro, Beyond Bitcoin and Cash: Do We Like a Central Bank Digital Currency? A Financial and 
Political Economics Approach 2 (Ctr. for Applied Rsch. on Int’l Markets, Banking, Fin., & 
Regul., Working Paper No. 65, 2017) (explaining that public utility of cash is disputed, as 
cash has two important drawbacks: contribution to the illegal economy, and hampering mone-
tary policy).
47. See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 4.
48. See generally Sayuri Shirai, Central Bank Digital Currency: Concepts and Trends,
VOX CEPR POL’Y PORTAL (Mar. 6, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/central-bank-digital-
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retail tokens based on a distributed ledger.
49
These examples are not exhaus-
tive: Uruguay and the People’s Republic of China have also piloted their 
own unique forms of CBDCs.
50
The global development of CBDCs raises many legal concerns; one of 
the most predominant questions is the appropriate degree of privacy that 
should be afforded to users of the currency.
51
International privacy law pre-
sents a set of concise, binding standards that states must take into considera-
tion when determining what framework should regulate the issuance of a 
CBDC.  Privacy is a fundamental human right recognized throughout inter-
national bodies and treaties.
52
The first modern recognition of the im-
portance of privacy at the international level came with the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”). Article 12 of the UDHR states 
that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputa-
tion. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such inter-
ference or attacks.”
53
This first pronouncement on the right to privacy show-
cases that the existence of the right to privacy has been considered neces-
necessary and uncontested from the drafting of the UDHR.
54
The right to privacy became legally binding on states that ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Article 17 
currency-concepts-and-trends (explaining that “The Riksbank has been actively considering 
the first two proposals under the ‘e-krona’ project. The first, ‘account-based retail CBDC’
proposal is the issuance of a digital currency to the general public in the form of directly 
providing an account at Riksbank. The second, [is the] ‘value-based retail CBDC.’”).
49. See Sayuri Shirai, Money and Central Bank Digital Currency (Asian Dev. Bank 
Inst. Working Paper No. 922, 2019), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication
/485856/adbi-wp922.pdf.
50. See Alun John, Explainer: How Does China’s Digital Yuan Work?, REUTERS (Oct. 
19, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-currency-digital-explainer/explainer-how-
does-chinas-digital-yuan-work-idUSKBN27411T; see also Marie Huillet, People’s Bank of 
China Progressing Smoothly with Digital Yuan, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 6, 2020), https:
//cointelegraph.com/news/peoples-bank-of-china-progressing-smoothly-with-digital-yuan. See
generally Gerardo Licandro, Uruguayan e-Peso on the Context of Financial Inclusion (Nov. 
16, 2018), https://www.bis.org/events/eopix_1810/licandro_pres.pdf.
51. See CPMI, supra note 19, at 9–10.
52. Compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter “ICCPR”], with G.A. Res. 217(III)A, Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter “UDHR”]. See generally PROMOTIONAL 
PRODUCTS ASS’N INT’L, THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (2018), https:
//www.ppai.org/media/2941/gdpr.pdf.
53. See UDHR, supra note 52, art. 12.
54. The Right to Privacy and Family Life, ICE. HUM. RTS. CTR., http://www.human
rights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-ideas-and-fora
/substantive-human-rights/the-right-to-privacy-and-family-life (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
There was no discussion debating whether or not to include the right to privacy. This indicates 
a guarantee that privacy would be included in some form. See U.N. Secretary-General, Anno-
tations on the Text of the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights, ¶ 99, U.N. Doc. A
/2929 (July 1, 1955).
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of the ICCPR states that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to un-
lawful attacks on his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
55
This binding 
provision is worded almost identically to the UDHR, with the sole differ-
ence between the two being that ICCPR article 17 prohibits not only “arbi-
trary” interferences with one’s privacy, but also “unlawful” ones.
56
B. The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age
The existence of an internationally recognized right to privacy, coupled 
with the broad interpretations promulgated in international courts, inherent-
ly acknowledges the existence of certain areas of an individual’s life that 
should be outside the scope of the state. The Human Rights Committee and 
regional human rights bodies interpret the right to privacy broadly through 
jurisprudence, commentary, and emerging state practices. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has held that the private sphere is “ex-
empt from and immune to abusive or arbitrary interference or attacks” by 
both public and private actors.
57
Further, in Murillo v. Costa Rica, the court
noted that the scope of protection of the right to privacy has been and should 
be interpreted in broad terms by the international human rights courts.
58
In 
Rosendo Cantu v. Mexico, the court has affirmatively described the right to 
privacy as a “wide-ranging term, which cannot be exhaustively defined.”
59
The broad adaptions of the right to privacy, stemming from article 17 of the 
ICCPR, suggest that the right is framed to protect a range of actions that fall 
within the private sphere of an individual’s life.
The right to privacy includes the right to one’s person and identity.
60
The modern interpretation of identity includes the consideration of a per-
son’s digital identity.
61
International organizations have warned about the 
impact of experimental technology on the right to privacy. The Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe holds that the privacy of individuals 
55. ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 17.
56. See generally Oliver Diggelmann & Maria Nicole Cleis, How the Right to Privacy 
Became a Human Right, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 441, 449 (July 7, 2014).
57. Murillo v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 142 (Nov. 
28, 2012) (explaining that the private sphere encompasses a wide range of factors associated 
with individual dignity, including but not limited to the right to autonomy, development and 
the right to establish and develop relationships with others, and the way the individual views 
themselves).
58. See id. ¶ 142.
59. Rosendo Cantu v. Mexico, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, ¶ 119 
(Aug. 31, 2010).
60. See The Right to Privacy and Family Life, supra note 54.
61. See Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [“OECD”], At a Crossroads: “Personhood”
and Digital Identity in the Information Society 7 (OECD Directorate for Science, Technology 
and Industry STI Working Paper 2007/7, 2008).
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should be guaranteed “in any research project requiring the use of personal 
data.”
62
Our online interactions challenge the traditional notions of privacy; 
as interactions using technology increase, individuals are more vulnerable to 
breaches of privacy.
63
These considerations of personal digital identities and 
online data must be considered when determining whether an action infring-
es on the right to privacy.
The United Nations anticipated the inherent tension that could arise be-
tween the right to privacy and technological developments.
64
Even in 1976, 
the Human Rights Commission suggested that developing international 
standards to protect the right to privacy was well within their competence, 
especially considering the impact of technological developments, such as 
recording.
65
This discussion highlights a consensus that technology should 
not be permitted to infringe on the areas of the private sphere that are ex-
empt from interference by public and private actors.
Since the adoption of article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the United Nations has undertaken resolutions to fur-
ther explain the right to privacy. In January 2014, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly adopted resolution 68/167.
66
This resolution both called on 
states to protect the right to privacy in the digital age and noted that interna-
tional human rights law provides the structure to examine instruments’ and 
actions’ compliance with the right to privacy.
67
The Special Rapporteur on 
the right to privacy found that while many jurisdictions committed them-
selves to protecting the right to privacy through the ICCPR, many of them 
simultaneously put the right at risk by employing new, but incompatible, 
technologies.
68
This acknowledgement of the riskiness of new technologies 
suggests that adoption of a CBDC could be considered an infringement if it 
sufficiently interferes with the right to privacy.
Instead of putting the right to privacy at risk, the OHCHR instructs that 
“privacy by design and default should be a central element for developing 
62. Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, On the Protection of Personal Data Used for 
Scientific Research and Statistics, ¶ 2.1, App. to Recommendation R(83)10, (Sept. 25, 1983).
63. See generally DEP’T PRIME MINISTER & CABINET, AUSTL., CONNECTING WITH 
CONFIDENCE: OPTIMISING AUSTRALIA’S DIGITAL FUTURE 11 (2011), http://indianstrategic
knowledgeonline.com/web/connecting_with_confidence_public_discussion_paper.pdf.
64. See Comm’n Human Rights, Rep. on the Thirtieth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4
/1116, at 10 (1976).
65. See id.
66. See generally G.A. Res. 68/167, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (Jan. 21, 
2014).
67. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. [“UNCTAD”], DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DATA FLOWS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 24 (2016).
68. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, Right to Privacy, ¶ 8,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/63 (2019).




 Developers are instructed to identify privacy implica-
tions before and during the development process.
70
 This instruction extends 
to the creators of CBDC, and charges them with the responsibility of con-
sidering the varying privacy risks between types. While the right to privacy 
is not absolute, any instance of infringement must be critically examined to 




Considering the guidance protecting the right to privacy in a digital age, 
the security and privacy of an individual’s financial data should be heavily 
scrutinized due its sensitive, and potentially valuable, nature.
72
 In analyzing 
the retention of personal data, the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister of Communications noted that the 
“protection of personal data [. . .] is especially important for the right to re-
spect for private life.”
73
 The development of a CBDC would create an un-
precedented aggregate of personal financial data, leading to increased vul-
nerability to cyber-attacks.
74
 The aggregation and centralization of sensitive 
personal data should be monitored by the international privacy frameworks. 
Currently, privacy considerations such as the restrictions on the usage of 
personal financial data by third parties are applied to digital money ac-
counts.
75
 The introduction of CBDCs and supporting technology requires an 




C.  Testing Whether an Action Infringes on the Right to Privacy 
Only a few decades ago, treaties promulgating fundamental human 
rights, including the right to privacy, were not seen as an instrument in re-
solving data privacy issues.
77
 This trend has shifted: The right to privacy is 
now the center of discussions surrounding data privacy. Today, article 17 of 
the ICCPR is commonly viewed as providing the basis for modern data pri-
 
 69. See INT’L NETWORK C.L. ORG., THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE, 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL ADOPTED RESOLUTION 34/7 4 (2018). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See UNCTAD, supra note 67, at 24. 
 72. See INT’L TELECOMM. UNION [“ITU”], REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND RISKS 
FOR CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY 13 (June 2019). 
 73. See Joined Cases C-293/12, C-594/12, Digit. Rts. Ir. Ltd. v. Minister of Commc’ns, 
Marine, & Nat. Res. et al., ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, ¶ 53 (Apr. 8, 2014). 
 74. See Schilling, supra note 38, at 4. 
 75. See ITU, supra note 72, at 14. 
 76. See id. (explaining the “broad social implications of digital technology necessitate 
that privacy issues, including the appropriate balance between anonymity and law enforce-
ment, should be deliberated”). 
 77. See LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PRIVACY LAW: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 82 
(2014). 
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vacy law, together with the resulting jurisprudence.
78
As such, article 17 and 
its interpretation will serve as the basis for analyzing international privacy 
standards for CBDCs in this note. The framework developed in article 17 of 
the ICCPR determines whether there has been an infringement on the right 
to privacy. Article 17 states that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, 
nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.”
79
The analysis of pri-
vacy law is conducted under the ICCPR because, as a convention, it is legal-
ly binding for signatories.
80
Further, the ICCPR has had the strongest impact 
on the national level, exerting legal order on the same governments that are 
exploring and piloting CBDCs.
81
The states bound by the ICCPR are bound 
primarily by negative obligations, and must refrain from interfering with an 
array of protected rights.
82
The language of article 17 draws a distinction between fundamental 
rights that are protected only from unlawful interference, such as honor, and 
rights that are protected from unlawful and arbitrary interference, such as 
privacy.
83
This language differs from the UDHR article 12 language, in 
which the term unlawful is not present. The two key terms that qualify the 
prohibited interference are then “arbitrary” and “unlawful.” When adopting 
language from article 12, the ICCPR drafters chose to prohibit arbitrary in-
terference with privacy, home, and correspondence, but eliminated the pro-
hibition on arbitrary interference on honor, which was present in article 12.
84
The language of article 17 shows that the drafters consciously maintained 
the protection on arbitrary interference on the right to privacy, while elimi-
nating the protection from other rights. Fundamentally, the addition of “un-
lawful” and maintenance on “arbitrary” suggests both terms should be given 
equal weight when determining whether an instrument or act is in violation 
of international privacy law.
As initially explored in Van Hulst v. Netherlands, for an interference 
with the right to privacy to be “non-arbitrary,” it must satisfy a four-part 
test: (1) pursuance of a legitimate aim, (2) rational connection to the legiti-
mate aim, (3) minimal impairment to the right of privacy, and (4) propor-
tionality between the pursuit of the legitimate aim and the limitation of the 
78. See id. at 82–84.
79. See ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 17.
80. See id.
81. Christion Tomuschat, Introductory Note: International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L. (2008), https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/iccpr
/iccpr.html.
82. David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 138 (1999), 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099&context=yjil.
83. See ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 17.
84. See UDHR, supra note 52, art. 12.




 The UN Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) released fur-
ther guidance on the interpretation of article 17 through General Comment 
16.
86
 General Comment 16 states that “[t]he introduction of the concept of 
arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by 
law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the 




Any suspected interference is subject to the arbitrary analysis, in effect 
requiring the interference to pass both the four-part proportionality assess-
ment as well as the reasonable circumstances assessment. 
General Comment 16 also elaborates on the lawful requirement, clarify-
ing that an interference on the right to privacy can only occur “on the basis 
of law” that is consistent with “the provisions, aims, and objectives of the 
covenant.”
88
 This analysis applies to both international law and domestic 
law.
89
 The domestic law must be accessible and foreseeable.
90
 Further, the 
domestic law must be precise and clearly defined.
91
 Thus, the lawfulness 
standard also has, in effect, a four-part test: (1) consistency with the cove-
nant, (2) pursuance to domestic and international law, (3) accessibility, and 
(4) clear definition. All of these standards, coupled with the four-part arbi-
trary test, explained above, must be met in order for an infringement on the 
right to privacy to be acceptable under article 17’s text. 
 
 85. See Van Hulst v. Netherlands, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 82d Sess., Commc’n No. 
903/1999, ¶¶ 7.3, 7.6, 7.10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/903/1999 (HRC 2004); see also AM. C. 
L. UNION [“ACLU”], PRIVACY RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW 
GENERAL COMMENT ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER ARTICLE 17 OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 25 (2014), https:
//www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-report-iccpr-web-rel1.pdf. 
 86. See generally Off. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., General Comment No. 16: Article 
17 (Right to Privacy) The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, 
and Protection of Honour and Reputation, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 1) (Apr. 8, 1988) [herein-
after General Comment 16]. 
 87. See id. ¶ 4. 
 88. See id. ¶ 3. 
 89. See ACLU, supra note 85, at 21, citing Tristán Donoso v. Panamá, Preliminary Ob-
jections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, ¶ 56 (2009); see 
also Kennedy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R., 207, 253 
(2010). 
 90. Kennedy, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 253. 
 91. Compare Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, Comments, Russian Federation, ¶ 19 U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.54 (July 26, 1995) (explaining that mechanisms to intrude into a private 
communication still exist without clear legislation), with id. ¶ 31 (recommending that the rela-
tionship between bodies charged with protection of human rights be clearly defined, and that a 
mechanism to ensure conformity with the convention is established). 
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V. THE APPLICATION OF THE LAWFUL STANDARD TO ACCOUNT-BASED 
AND TOKEN-BASED CBDCS
While both token-based and account-based CBDCs should be analyzed 
under article 17, it is important to recognize that the forms present inherent-
ly different privacy risks due to the structure of the technology. The pre-
dominant distinction between account-based and token-based general pur-
pose CBDCs is that account-based CBDCs employ intermediates to verify 
the identity of the purchaser, while token-based CBDCs use tokens that are 
verified by the receiver.
92
Any CBDC would likely look different than a 
permissionless, peer-to-peer model seen in currencies like Bitcoin.
93
How-
ever, even the United States’ Federal Reserve Board recognizes that an ac-
count-based model where the central bank issues a CBDC directly to con-
sumer accounts would raise huge legal questions, presumably concentrated 
within the privacy framework.
94
The central bank in an account-based sys-
tem would be privy to all citizens’ financial data, allowing the central bank 
to view sensitive transactions.
95
While the token-based model of CBDCs 
would raise considerable regulatory and policy questions, it is possible that 
the issuing central bank, through applying DLT and encryption technolo-
gies, could realize anonymity in order to protect the privacy of the individu-
al consumers.
96
The account-based CBDC presents a higher level of gov-
ernment interference with personal financial data, and provides the 
individual with less privacy.
To test whether a general-purpose CBDC is lawful under article 17, the 
currency should be evaluated on four requirements: (1) consistency with the 
covenant, (2) pursuance to domestic and international law, (3) accessibility, 
and (4) clear definition. The first prong holds that in whatever form it takes, 
the CBDC must be consistent with the aims and goals of the ICCPR. article 
17 should be read in light of General Comment 16, which provides that laws 
that permit interference should be “in accordance with the provisions, aims 
and objectives of the covenant.”
97
When article 17 was being considered, 
there was no dispute as to the principle involved because “privacy, the sanc-
tity of the home, the secrecy of correspondence and the honour and reputa-
tion of persons were protected under the constitutions or laws of most, if not 
all countries.”
98
The notion of “privacy” as included in the ICCPR was based on a 
common understanding of what the potential threats to the right would be in 
92. See Barontini & Holden, supra note 23, at 11.
93. See WORLD BANK supra note 24, at 34.
94. See Brainard, supra note 26, at 8.
95. Schilling, supra note 38, at 3.
96. See Yanagawa & Yamaoka, supra note 1, at 11.
97. General Comment 16, supra note 86,  ¶ 3.
98. Rep. of the 9
th
Sess. of the Comm’n on Hum. Rts., ¶ 67 U.N. Doc. E/2447-E/CN.4
/689 (June 6, 1953).
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1966. Digital currencies were not known in 1966; the concept of a secure 
digital currency has been theorized only since the 1980s.
99
In the 1960s, the 
international ratios of physical fiat currency in circulation to nominal GDP 
was at its peak.
100
Thus, article 17 was drafted in a global economy in which 
payment privacy was not questioned, as cash provided a widespread way to 
transact anonymously. Further, there is no mention of payment systems in 
the ICCPR. While the authors considered the ability to make payments for 
other purposes,
101
they did not elaborate on any particular right relating to 
consumer payments or finance. CBDCs do not fall explicitly within the aims 
or goals of the covenant. A payment system that risks consumer privacy in 
some forms is at fundamental tension with the understanding of anonymity 
in payments at the time the framers drafted the covenant.
102
An account-
based CBDC is tied to an identity system; from a technological perspective, 
this eliminates privacy and requires identification of the user.
103
Choosing a 
system that discards payment privacy, especially in a cashless society, is not 
consistent with the aims of the covenant.
The second prong of the lawfulness standard requires the action to be 
pursuant to both domestic and international law. An understanding of the 
restriction on “unlawful” activities reflects an understanding that an action, 
even if not arbitrary, must still be envisaged by law.
104
For an action or in-
strument to be pursuant to both domestic and international law, there must 
not be a more-narrow, less-intrusive way of reasonably achieving the same 
99. See generally DAVID CHAUM, BLIND SIGNATURES FOR UNTRACEABLE PAYMENTS
(1982), http://www.hit.bme.hu/~buttyan/courses/BMEVIHIM219/2009/Chaum.BlindSigFor
Payment.1982.PDF (this paper is considered one of the first proposals of a digital currency in 
history).
100. See John Bagnall, David Bounie, Kim P. Huynh, Anneke Kosse, Tobias Schmidt, 
Scott Schuh, & Helmut Stix, Consumer Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Comparison with 
Payment Diary Survey Data, INT’L J. CENT. BANKING, Dec. 2016, at 1.
101. See ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 14. ICCPR article 14(d) makes the only statement 
pertaining to finance or payments within the ICCPR: “Everyone shall be entitled. . . to defend 
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing. . . to have legal assistance 
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by
him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it.” (emphasis added).
102. Diggelman & Cleis supra note 56, at 451 (“In the third committee of the General 
Assembly, the discussions focused on the relationship between the protection of privacy in 
general, the family and the home.); see Andrea Ryan, Gunnar Trumbull & Peter Tufano, A
Brief Postwar History of U.S. Consumer Finance, 85 BUS. HIST. REV. 461, 463 (2011) (ex-
plaining that even in the U.S., less than a decade before the ICCPR was drafted, “nearly all 
payment activity. . . was paper based: essentially cash, checks and money orders.” This would 
have been the status quo for the drafters.)
103. Auer & Böehme, supra note 20, at 86–87.
104. See BYGRAVE, supra note 77, at 92 (arguing that under ECHR Article 8(2), com-
monly read as the affirmative obligations that complement the ICCPR prohibitions, there must 
be a legal basis for the interference. The legal basis can be statutory, found in rules, or judi-
cially developed).
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results available to the government.
105
Further, as shown in Kononov v. Lat-
via, conduct must be analyzed under both the domestic and applicable inter-
national law; it cannot be analyzed merely on the more favorable stand-
ard.
106
On a global scale, domestic privacy laws vary widely; much of this dis-
crepancy depends on whether a national society tends towards modern indi-
vidualism or towards collectivism.
107
Due to the divergence between states, 
it is beyond the scope of this note to determine whether a CBDC, token-
based or account-based, is explicitly permitted by domestic law in each ju-
risdiction. State entities may not look at protected information directly, but 
rather monitor, collect, and store mass amounts of personal data indefinite-
ly.
108
Even this moderate approach impacts the privacy of individuals by al-
lowing governments to access significant amounts of data that otherwise 
would not exist.
109
On an international scale, the systemic public collection of personal da-
ta can fall within the scope of private life protected by article 17 when it “is 
systemically collected and stored in files held by the authorities.”
110
As not-
ed by the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, states are risking their 
compliance with article 17 by implementing new, more invasive technolo-
gies.
111
Though account-based CBDCs are likely not explicitly prohibited in 
domestic legislation, the concept behind the technology would permit the 
central bank to use an owner register, essentially allowing for full transpar-
ency of the amount of money in each account, as well as the amount and re-
cipient of money transfers.
112
A token-based CBDC, while dependent on the 
technology used in each state, has the potential to allow for peer-to-peer 
transfers, similar to cash, without the oversight or easily identifiable ac-
counts of a central bank clearing house.
113
Though storing personal data 
alone does not violate article 17, it does risk running afoul of the European 
105. See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION [“EFF”], NECESSARY &
PROPORTIONATE: INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW TO COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE 20 (May 2014), https://www.ohchr.org
/Documents/Issues/Privacy/ElectronicFrontierFoundation.pdf.
106. See Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 232–244 
(2010).
107. See generally Gerard Roland & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Understanding the Individ-
ualism-Collectivism Cleavage and Its Effects: Lessons from Cultural Society, in INSTITUTIONS 
AND COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 213 (Masahiko Aoki, Timur Kuran, & Gerard 
Roland eds., 2012).
108. See EFF, supra note 105, at 7.
109. See id.
110. See Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 43, (2000) (also ex-
plaining that there is no reason of principle to justify excluding activities of a professional or 
business nature from the notion of “private life.”).
111. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, supra note 68, ¶ 8.
112. See Shirai, supra note 49.
113. See Terracciano & Somoza, supra note 28.
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Court of Justice’s proposition to give personal financial data the utmost pri-
vacy, and the European Court of Human Rights’ intention to preserve a pri-
vate identity in spite of modern technology.
114
 
However, the analysis of lawfulness does not end with a simple allow-
ance of infringement by law; rather, the application of the law on the specif-
ic instance of infringement on privacy must also be reasonably foreseeable 
and “detail the precise circumstances in which such interferences may be 
permitted.”
115
 Individuals must be able to discern from the language of the 
law the “circumstances in which and conditions on which public authorities 
are entitled” to breach the right to privacy.
116
 Further, states that are signato-
ries to the ICCPR not only have the responsibility to detail permissible in-
terferences, but also have the affirmative obligation to “undertake the neces-
sary steps to adopt laws or other measures. . . as may be necessary to give 
effect” to the right to privacy.
117
 Currently, mandates permitting the creation 
of a CBDC are not widespread. As of 2017, roughly twenty-five percent of 
central banks have the legal authority through their domestic mandates to 
issue a CBDC, thirty-three percent do not have the legal authority to do so, 
and the remainder of central banks are unsure as to the legality of an issu-
ance.
118
 The widespread lack of certain legal authority presents a large hur-
dle for central banks; if laws permitting infringement of privacy must detail 
the precise circumstances in which interferences may be allowed, and finan-
cial data should be afforded a high degree of privacy, there must be explicit 
detailed authorization to infringe on the anonymity of payments. Further, 
the General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Privacy requires ICCPR 
signatories to affirmatively shape legislation to protect individuals’ rights 
recognized in the covenant.
119
 For the central banks without a current legal 
mandate to issue a CBDC, any legislation constructing a mandate would 
have to protect the right to privacy in order to be consistent with the juris-
diction’s international obligations. Again, account-based CBDCs, when 





 114. See Joined Cases C-293/12, C-594/12, Digit. Rts. Ir. Ltd. v. Minister of Commc’ns, 
Marine, & Nat. Res. et al., ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 (Apr. 8, 2014); see also Malone v. United 
Kingdom, App. No 8691/79, 1984 Eur. Ct. H.R. (explaining that The Convention protects the 
community of men; man in our times has a need to preserve his identity, to refuse the total 
transparency of society, to maintain the privacy of his personality). 
 115. General Comment 16, supra note 86, ¶ 8; see also Van Hulst v. Netherlands, U.N. 
Hum. Rts. Comm. 82d Sess., Commc’n No. 903/1999, ¶¶ 7.3, 7.6, 7.10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C
/82/D/903/1999 (HRC 2004). 
 116. See Taylor-Sabori v. United Kingdom, App. No. 47114/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 4 (2002). 
 117. See ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 2. 
 118. See Barontini & Holden, supra note 23, at 12. 
 119. G.A. Res. 69/166, U.N. Doc. A/RES/69/166, at 4 (Dec. 18, 2014). 
 120. See Terracciano & Somoza, supra note 28. 
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V.  THE APPLICATION OF THE ARBITRARY STANDARD TO ACCOUNT-
BASED AND TOKEN-BASED CBDCS 
A.  Overview of the Standard 
While the lawfulness standard of article 17 does not provide a solidified 
answer to the question of legality of account-based or token-based CBDCs, 
the analysis does not end with the “unlawful” provision. Rather, the drafters 
of the ICCPR included both an unlawful and an arbitrariness standard.121 As 
anticipated above, the arbitrary standard is often argued to have four prongs, 
the instrument must: (1) pursue a legitimate aim, (2) have a rational connec-
tion to that aim, (3) minimally impair the right to privacy, and (4) strike a 
fair balance between the pursuit of the aim and the limitation of the right.
122
 
Further, the introduction of the arbitrariness standard is intended to serve as 
a limit on the lawfulness standard; conduct that may be acceptable under in-
ternational and domestic law may still be deemed to infringe on the right to 
privacy if it does not meet the four factor test.
123
 Thus, in addition to being 
considered lawful, any introduction of a CBDC needs to satisfy all four fac-
tors. 
B.  Pursuance of a Legitimate Aim 
The CBDC, whether in account-based or token-based form, must be 
created to pursue a legitimate aim; this factor is easily satisfied in most cas-
es. Generally, emerging market economies have stronger motivations to de-
velop a CBDC compared to advanced economies.
124
 However, both types of 
economies list motivations for creating a CBDC as factors such as financial 
stability, monetary policy implementation, financial inclusion, domestic 
payments efficiency, cross-border payments efficiency, and payment safe-
 
 121. See generally ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 17. 
 122. See ACLU, supra note 85, at 24. The gist of this four-factor test is widely accepted, 
but occasionally is phrased differently. For example, in Tristán Donoso v. Panamá, Prelimi-
nary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, ¶ 56 
(2009), the Inter-American Court held that restrictions on privacy “must be statutorily enact-
ed, serve a legitimate purpose, and meet the requirements of suitability, necessity, and propor-
tionality which render it necessary in a democratic society.” The “statutorily enacted” re-
quirement is directly analogizable to the lawfulness standard, the “legitimate purpose” to the 
legitimate aim, the “suitability” to the rational connection, the “necessity” to the minimal im-
pairment, and the “proportionality” to the fair balance. 
 123. See General Comment 16, supra note 86, ¶ 4; see also Van Hulst v. Netherlands, 
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 82d Sess., Commc’n No. 903/1999, ¶¶ 7.3, 7.6, 7.10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/82/D/903/1999 (HRC 2004). 
 124. See CODRUTA BOAR, HENRY HOLDEN, & AMBER WADSWORTH, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, BIS PAPERS NO. 107: IMPENDING ARRIVAL—A SEQUEL TO THE SURVEY ON 
CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY 1 (Jan. 2019). 
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ty.
125
Digitization of money has its roots in historical progression; from 
coins for local commerce to checks for long distance, the evolution of mon-
ey has been centered around rightful ownership and trust.
126
The evolving 
form of money is expected to maintain legitimacy and traceable ownership, 
while at the same time becoming more user-friendly, readily available, safe, 
and protected against crime and invasion of privacy.
127
The evolution of a 
CBDC promulgated by a central bank fits into the historical narrative of the 
expectations of currency, as factors such as payment safety and financial in-
clusion facilitate a readily available, safe currency; this suggests the aims of 
creating a CBDC are legitimate under article 17.
C. Rationally Connected to the Legitimate Aim
Further, the issuance of both token and account-based CBDCs are ra-
tionally connected to the various goals suggested by central banks. CBDC 
has attracted interest for its proposed ability to address challenges identified 
by central bankers, such as “financial inclusion, payments efficiency, and 
payment system operational and cyber resilience.”
128
Further, the implemen-
tation of a CBDC would provide an instrument to pursue rational policy 
goals such as anti-money laundering, know your customer, and reduction of 
tax evasion, though these areas are not frequently the primary goal of the 
central bank.
129
Both account-based and token-based CBDCs can be created 
to pursue a legitimate aim, and can be rationally connected to that aim. The 
first two prongs of the arbitrary standard are not in contention.
D. Minimal Impairment on the Right to Privacy
Although CBDCs are not prohibited on the basis of lawfulness or legit-
imacy alone, the application of the remainder of the arbitrary standard raises 
125. Id. at 4. Most of these factors apply in varying degrees based on the development of 
the respondent economy. For example, domestic payment efficiency and financial inclusion 
were rated as “very important” for emerging market economies, whereas payment safety was 
rated as “very important” for advanced economies. Cross border payment efficiency is the 
most important for advanced economies researching a wholesale CBDC, but is outside the 
scope of this note; see also BANK OF CANADA, MONETARY AUTH. OF SINGAPORE, AND BANK 
OF ENGLAND, CROSS-BORDER INTERBANK PAYMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS: EMERGING 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION (2019).
126. See Lagarde, supra note 3, at 2.
127. Id.
128. WORLD ECON. F. [“WEF”], CENTRAL BANKS AND DISTRIBUTED LEDGER 
TECHNOLOGY: HOW ARE CENTRAL BANKS EXPLORING BLOCKCHAIN TODAY? 4 (2019); but 
see WALTER ENGERT & BEN S.C. FLUNG, BANK OF CANADA, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL 
CURRENCY: MOTIVATIONS AND IMPLICATION (2017) (where increasing competition in pay-
ments and financial stability are considered to be sound motivations for issuing a CBDC, fi-
nancial inclusion can be legitimate reasoning, but reducing effective lower bound on interest 
rates and inhibiting criminal activity are not legitimate aims for issuance).
129. See WEF, supra note 128, at 9.
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the largest, and potentially detrimental, hurdles for account-based CBDCs, 
especially in a cashless society. Prong three of the arbitrary interference test 
requires states to choose the infringement that has minimal impairment on 
privacy. An account-based CBDC would not “minimally impair” the right 
to privacy because the centralized structure requires reliance on the central 
bank to act as the central node. The use of a central node amplifies the 
amount of information a state could access and would minimize the amount 
of privacy a consumer would be able to choose.
130
The imposition of a min-
imal impairment standard implies that encroachment on privacy must not be 
merely useful to the state, but rather there is a direct and immediate nexus 
between the legitimate aim and the remedy suggested.
131
Further, even ac-
tions taken in accordance with a legitimate aim can be found to violate in-
ternational privacy guidelines when there is no adequate guarantee against 
abuse.
132
While there are a wide variety of approaches to issuance of a 
CBDC, it is possible to use distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) in a to-
ken-based system to settle peer to peer transactions, eliminating the need for 
a central record-keeper.
133
Using DLT in this way could enable central banks 
to issue a token-based CBDC that would not require central bank interfer-
ence for settlement. A token-based system would limit the amount of infor-
mation available to the government when compared to the account-based 
system, and act similarly to the role of cash. Because of the availability of a 
less intrusive alternative, an account-based system likely does not satisfy the 
minimal impairment standard.
While state actors benefit from a wide scope of deference to the means 
chosen for achieving the legitimate aim, deference will not be given to eve-
ry instance of impairment.
134
CBDCs present a clear occasion of multiple 
discrete forms of infringement achieving similar results, with strikingly dif-
ferent privacy implications. In a token-based system, user A could send the 
CBDC from their wallet, through a decentralized system, to user B’s wal-
let.
135
Many systems utilizing DLT rely on the identification of the token be-
ing transferred as legitimate, rather than rely on the identification of the 
130. Schilling, supra note 38, at 3.
131. See Brief of Amici Curiae, United Nations Human Rights Experts in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal, John Doe (Kidane) v. The Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, No. 16-7081 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 1, 2016).
132. See Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Decision on Admissibility, 
Eur. Ct. H. R., ¶ 106 (June 29, 2006).
133. See CPMI, supra note 19, at 8.
134. See generally Weber, App. No. 54934/00 supra note 132, ¶ 80 (interferences must 
not only have a legitimate aim, but must also be justified, and be necessary in a democratic 
society in order to achieve those aims).
135. See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 8 (however, the ledger where the 
token is sent could also be centralized, and thus lack the anonymity in the described example).




 These systems are similar to cash, in that the transfer 
of value is decentralized and does not require a central clearing party.
137
 In 
contrast, in an account-based system, the payor must be identified as the 
proper owner of the account from which the transaction is being sent.
138
 The 
distinction between these two systems is one of central bank control and 
amount of anonymity. The account-based system could permit the central 
bank to view all transactions of account holders, whereas the token-based 
system can be designed to mitigate these privacy concerns.
139
 
Further, even if a central bank were to consider the minimal impairment 
standard, central banks would have no individual incentives to issue a 
CBDC that would transfer anonymously with validation by distributed ledg-
er technology.
140
 Doing so would weaken their role as a regulator or super-
visory body.
141
 The current proposals for CBDC are generally not for media 
that circulates anonymously peer-to-peer, but rather for a central clearing 
system.
142
 A leading cryptocurrency critic, Roubini, acknowledges that the 
currency central banks are envisaging issuance of would rely on a central-
ized system, with a single ledger, available to every individual in the econ-
omy, thereby avoiding any situation with private transactions.
143
 This system 
could dominate not only cash deposits, but also alternative payment systems 
such as PayPal or Square, because the rational consumer would not pay 
even a small fee for payment transfer services provided by the central bank 
for free.
144
 In effect, the central bank’s ability to enhance their own role in 
the payment infrastructure by creating a system where all payments go 
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through a central bank clearinghouse could squeeze out more anonymous 
payment systems. The elimination of more anonymous payment systems 
would minimally impair the right to privacy. 
Past examples of regulatory abuse showcase why an account-based 
CBDC in a cashless society could be disastrous for the international right to 
privacy. For example, in the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation worked to decline banking services to lawfully operating busi-
nesses such as payday lenders.
145
 In order to accomplish this goal, the gov-
ernment agencies had to pressure banks to cut off banking relationships with 
the targeted companies.
146
 Crucially, paper notes remained an option for do-
ing business if the legal entity was denied a bank account.
147
 However, if 
this regulatory abuse reoccurred in a cashless economy, the regulators could 
make it impossible for legal businesses to process payments as there would 
be no anonymous alternative. Instead of relying on pressuring private enti-
ties, the authorities could directly monitor and shut down retail accounts,
148
 
halting any access to currency.
149
 The least restrictive measure to protect a 
legitimate aim should not have the potential to stunt various industries, lead-
ing to potential collapses of entire businesses.
150
 Account-based CBDCs un-
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dertaken in a cashless society would be privy to this type of abuse without 
guaranteeing adequate safeguards, and thus would impair the right to priva-
cy.
151
E. Proportionality of the Pursuit of the Aim and the Limitation of the 
Right
Finally, any potential infringement promulgated by the state must be 
analyzed under a proportionality test, comparing the balance between the 
pursuit of an aim and the limitation of the right. When any restriction is 
made that infringes on a fundamental right, states must only undertake ef-
forts that “are proportionate to the pursuance of legitimate aims in order to 
ensure continuous and effective protection of Covenant rights [. . .]. In no 
case may the restrictions be applied or invoked in a manner that would im-
pair the essence of a covenant right.”152 For states that pursue a CBDC as an 
alternative to cash as physical currency use dwindles or becomes unavaila-
ble due to exigent circumstances, the argument to proportionally limit pri-
vacy may exist, as having some form of currency is necessary for individu-
als to make transactions. However, states that adopt a CBDC for alternate 
reasons, such as preference for less cash or better compliance with counter-
ing-the-financing-of-terrorism (“CFT”) regulations, are likely in violation of 
the proportionality standard of article 17.
Countries that face a bona fide currency access crisis may have more 
demanding, legitimate state aims in issuing a CBDC;
153
these higher stakes
aims may allow slightly more limitation on the right to privacy but never a 
complete limitation.
154
For example, in states such as the Republic of Mar-
shall Islands, where the population risks being cut off from the financial 
system completely due to geographic and economic constraints,
155
the need 
for some widely accessible form of currency is apparent. However, any 
form of currency must not only serve a permissible purpose, but also allow 
for the maximum amount of privacy to be maintained.
156
Although currency 
presents a special consideration of bulk collection of personal transaction 
data, an individual must have a method of purchasing power to be an active 
participant in the economy. Concerns have already been raised about the 
151. See Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Decision on Admissibility, 
Eur. Ct. H. R., ¶ 106 (June 29, 2006).
152. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., General Comment No. 31, the Nature of 
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
31CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, (May 26, 2004) (emphasis added) [hereinafter General Com-
ment 31].
153. See Ye & Desouza, supra note 36.
154. See Emmerson, supra note 150, ¶ 19.
155. IMF, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Selected Issues, IMF Country Rep. No. 18
/271, at 3, 10 (2018) (explaining that while some do not agree the SOV is a CBDC, it is not 
disputed that access to traditional banking is minimal).
156. See General Comment 31, supra note 152, ¶¶ 11–16.
Winter 2021] The Privacy Cost of Currency 425
ability of the state to access data in the first place, and subsequently share it 
among different parts of the state.
157
Should states eliminate physical fiat 
currency and issue a CBDC, governments would have unparalleled access 
to financial transactions, bypassing the first concern of access to the data. 
Thus, the risk of violating the proportionality constraint in this instance is 
striking: While populations undeniably need currency for reasons such as 
financial inclusion, the anonymity offered by cash is vital in maintaining the 
least invasive solution to the right to privacy. In jurisdictions where access 
to cash is threatened, CBDCs may be a viable solution.
158
However, in order 
to comply with both the least intrusive instrument and proportionality stand-
ards, states must adopt CBDCs that do not completely demolish anonymity 
in payments.
Alternatively, other states are motivated to promulgate a CBDC due to 
an unwanted “high reliance on cash. . . and improving know-your-customer 
and countering-the-financing-of-terrorism (“KYC”/”CFT”) arrange-
ments.”
159
This motivation ultimately violates international privacy law if 
the CBDC does not have privacy safeguards and is issued in lieu of cash. 
States are permitted to infringe on the article 17 right to privacy for certain 
legitimate aims. However, the former special rapporteur explicitly affirmed 
that “countering terrorism is not a trump card which automatically legiti-
mates interferences with the right to privacy.”
160
The policy goals of enhanc-
ing KYC and CFT are a microcosm of the classical tradeoffs in record-
keeping systems between access, privacy, and security.
161
Issuing a CBDC 
represents an attempt at achieving perfect security, inevitably sacrificing 
consumer privacy. The tradeoff between access and privacy is analogizable 
to the type of system being utilized.
162
Proponents of issuing a CBDC for 
KYC or CFT purposes tend to rely on the model of an account-based cur-
rency.
163
However, the account-based system requires the central clearing 
party to verify each transaction,
164
leading to mass surveillance of every 
transfer. In a system without an option for receiver verification (i.e., without 
token-based digital currencies), utilizing a CBDC to increase KYC or CFT 
policy goals represents a disproportionate infringement of privacy.
157. Fred H. Cate, James X. Dempsey & Ira S. Rubenstein, Systemic Government Ac-
cess to Private-Sector Data, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 198 (2012).
158. See generally IMF, supra note 155 (discussing the issue of access to cash).
159. See BOAR ET AL., supra note 124, at 4.
160. Martin Scheinin, Special Rapporteur, The Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with Countering Terrorism, ¶ 13 U.N. Doc A/HRC/13/37 
(2009).
161. See generally Kahn et al., supra note 136, at 9.
162. See generally id.
163. See generally SRIRAM DARBHA & RAKESH ARORA, BANK OF CANADA, PRIVACY 
IN CBDC TECHNOLOGY, STAFF ANALYTICAL NOTE 2020-09 (June 2020).
164. See Kahn et al., supra note 136, at 9.
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Ultimately, due to the least restrictive infringement principle and the 
requirement that any infringement be proportionate, the use of an account-
based CBDC in a cashless society is in violation of international privacy 
law. While infringing on privacy through the promulgation of CBDCs can-
not be summarily condemned,
165
the existence of anonymous means of 
payment provides a critical channel for individuals to choose to protect their 
digital life from mass data collection. Additionally, the existence of a token-
based CBDC, where tokens can be verified by the recipient rather than a 
central clearing house, suggests that account-based CBDCs are not the least 
restrictive infringement on privacy in many, if not all, cases. Finally, while 
certain policy aims may be regarded as lawful and legitimate, the complete 
mass interference with privacy in payments strongly suggests a dispropor-
tionate outcome.
PART V: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The token-based model, discussed throughout the paper, can prevail on 
privacy concerns when designed to maintain anonymity in payments.
166
Un-
fortunately for the implementation of CBDC technology, decentralized to-
kens will cost a magnitude more than alternate models.
167
Many central 
banks are in the investigative stage and do not plan to immediately issue a 
CBDC;
168
this delayed timeline suggests that a potential solution to avoid 
violating international privacy laws is to wait until the decentralized token 
technology is widespread and developed enough to offset the greater cost of 
verification. By delaying the introduction of a CBDC model, states may be 
able to avoid having to make the choice between privacy, security, and ac-
cess.
Further, if states choose to pursue a CBDC, central banks should recog-
nize the fundamental tension between international privacy laws and central 
bank incentives. Central banks may lack incentive, besides compliance with 
international privacy laws, to issue a digital currency that would be validat-
ed by a distributed ledger system and circulate anonymously.
169
Due to this 
lack of incentive, central banks should take specific note of the balance of 
the pursuit of the aim and the limitation on the right to privacy and cautious-
ly approach CBDCs with the goal of preserving access to anonymous pay-
ment methods. Importantly, individual consumers value anonymity in cur-
165. See Emmerson, supra note 150, ¶ 7 (reasoning that an assessment of the legality 
and proportionality of surveillance measures must be undertaken using a case by case basis).
166. See MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 11.
167. See Sarah Allen, James Grimmelmann, Ari Juels, & Eswar Prasad, Design Choices 
for Central Bank Digital Currency, BROOKINGS (July 23, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu
/blog/up-front/2020/07/23/design-choices-for-central-bank-digital-currency/ (explaining that 
while there are cryptographic systems to maintain privacy, they are complex and costly).
168. See generally Barontini & Holden, supra note 23, at 7–8.
169. See White, supra note 142.
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rency.
170
Previous attempts to digitize payments on a state to individual basis 
have already raised many concerns in states such as Australia and represent 
the extension of government regulation into personal autonomy and private 
life.
171
PART VI: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
As technology progresses, central banks are not only presented with 
more options on how to pursue currency, but also must consider the best op-
tions in light of international standards protecting the right to privacy.
172
Ar-
ticle 17 of the ICCPR creates an external limit on the innovation of CBDCs, 
as Central Banks themselves may not have an incentive to pursue the most 
anonymous form of currency. Article 17 imposes two umbrella standards to 
consider for any potential infringement of privacy: lawfulness and arbitrari-
ness. The four-part test to determine whether an infringement on privacy is 
lawful is: (1) consistency with the covenant, (2) pursuant to domestic and 
international law, (3) accessibility, and (4) clearly defined. The four-part 
test to determine whether an infringement on privacy is arbitrary is: (1) pur-
suance of a legitimate aim, (2) rational connection to the legitimate aim, (3) 
minimal impairment to the right of privacy, and (4) proportionality between 
the pursuit of the legitimate aim and the limitation of the right to privacy.
Proposed CBDCs should be analyzed under article 17 because of the 
sensitive nature of the mass aggregation of financial data. In particular, 
states that are moving towards a cashless society, whether involuntarily or 
voluntarily, must not eliminate the ability to transact and make payments 
anonymously. Central banks that choose to experiment with CBDCs should 
ensure that their currencies are lawful and not arbitrary. Crucially, under the 
arbitrary infringement analysis, the CBDC must minimally impair privacy 
and must not infringe on privacy more than they pursue a legitimate policy 
goal. All aspects considered of both the arbitrary and lawfulness tests, to-
ken-based CBDCs present the option for a more anonymous alternative to 
physical fiat payment when compared to the account-based CBDC alterna-
tive. Though the anonymity of cash is difficult to replicate, a token-based 
system provides for a peer-to-peer transfer system that does not require the 
approval or aggregation of personal financial data in a central clearing-
house. Ultimately, the account-based CBDC violates international privacy 
standards due to the development of the token-based alternative that inher-
ently intrudes less on the right to privacy.
170. See supra Borgonovo et al, supra note 16, at 28.
171. See generally Michael Edwards, Move to Cash-Free Economy Comes with Con-
cerns Over Privacy, Cybercrime, Expert Warns, ABCNEWS (Mar. 27, 2017), https:
//www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-28/how-much-privacy-will-you-lose-in-a-cashless-society
/8390460.
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